Here are the 273 recommendations from the DOJ's report on the Uvalde school shooting

UVALDE, Texas — The Department of Justice released a full review on Thursday regarding law enforcement's response to the May 2022 mass shooting at Robert Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas.

A gunman shot and killed 19 children and two teachers before he was fatally shot.

The review, which was based on hundreds of interviews with police and others, found “cascading failures of leadership, decision-making, tactics, policy and training.”

In a press conference, the DOJ said they listed 273 recommendations for how officials should respond to mass casualty incidents. 

Here are those recommendations:

1. Officers responding to an active shooter and other dynamic scenes should maintain cognizance of potential crossfire upon their initial approach and make tactical adjustments as soon as feasible.
2. Law enforcement agencies should ensure officers are trained on one-, two-, three-, and four-person team formations that are taught in active shooter training courses. These formations are designed to allow the greatest opportunity for success for officers in locating and addressing the threat with whatever weapon system they have on their person
3. Officers responding to an active shooter incident must continually seek to eliminate the threat and enable victim response. The shooter’s immediate past actions and likely future actions serve as “triggering points” that indicate the appropriate response should be in line with active shooter response protocols. An active shooter with access to victims should never be considered and treated as a barricaded subject.
4. Officers responding to an active shooter incident or dynamic scenes with evolving threats should continually assess their surroundings and stimuli and seek to obtain an accurate picture of the incident to inform their decision-making and tactical approach.
5. Law enforcement training academies and providers should ensure that active shooter training modules include the factors in determining active shooter versus barricaded subject situations. 
6. Officers on the scene of an active shooter incident should be cognizant of their description of the situation and how it can influence other officers as they arrive. These status updates, known as L-CANs (Location, Conditions, Actions, Needs) are integral to an effective and informed law enforcement response, particularly with assets en route to an evolving situation.
7. Law enforcement agencies and training providers should ensure L-CANs are routinely included in training scenarios where applicable, including active shooter training. Other options for improving officer L-CAN discipline may include incorporating into rollcall, running L-CAN drills, and including as part of an agency’s formal after action review process for all critical incidents.
8. Room clearings and evacuations must be conducted systematically. Officers should establish a standard approach that physically mark rooms that are cleared. The approach should be simple and achievable for any room. For many law enforcement agencies, a marker or chalk is used to mark an “X” on the door once its room is cleared. Doing so serves both an officer safety and resource management purpose. Law enforcement agencies and training providers should ensure this instruction is provided when training on clearing buildings.
9. Officers responding to an active shooter incident must first and foremost drive toward the threat to eliminate it. In the event there are resources available and an opportunity to evacuate bystanders and victims from the hot zone, officers must balance the risk posed by evacuation versus the risk posed by remaining in lockdown and potentially in the crossfire. Evacuations in such circumstances must be conducted in the most expeditious manner, limited to those immediately in harm’s way, and not at the expense of the priority to eliminate the threat. In the case of Robb Elementary, the CIR team concludes that the effort to evacuate was protracted and should not have caused such significant delay in the eventual entry into rooms 111/112.
10. Officers responding to an active shooter incident must be prepared to approach the threat and breach or enter a room using just the tools they have with them, which is often a standard-issue firearm/service weapon.
11. Law enforcement agencies should adopt active shooter training national standards. The adoption of such standards is critical in the support and development of effective response tactics. The training, by design, enables a de-facto team of similarly trained officers who could rapidly assemble, communicate, and act as a team to rapidly stop the killing and stop the dying.
12. Law enforcement leaders on scene must work with available resources and personnel on scene and when the situation becomes stagnant, create an operational inner perimeter with a tactical team, removing all other personnel to avoid overcompensating the situation with unnecessary personnel.
13. Leaders providing direction in an active shooter incident must balance the urgency to stop the shooter with capabilities and approaches that may be time-consuming. The amount of time that has passed and the probability of success or improved outcomes should be considered when making such decisions
14. The assessment on the viability of using a sniper should have been conducted earlier in the incident, as soon as the location of the subject was known. There were multiple officers with SWAT training and experience that could have conducted such an assessment within the first 10 minutes of the law enforcement response.
15. All equipment assigned by an agency requires specific training and may only be utilized by those officers assigned to that particular piece of equipment. Ideally, an agency may consider assigning specialized equipment to patrol officers to enhance the operational capacity of an emergency response. It should be noted that the equipment listed is not all required as collective response and is recommended to be utilized individually as available to further enhance the onscene capabilities of an officer(s) responding to a critical emergency such as an active shooter situation. Each tool enhances its capacity and capability, but no single piece of ancillary equipment is required for a response to an active shooter.
16. Agencies should also consider ensuring equipment is available at critically vulnerable locations, such as schools and other soft targets. Depending on the capacity of the police department, “readily available” may be defined as having the equipment in the possession of a trained officer or within close proximity to acquire the equipment for an emergency response. 
17. When experiencing radio voids or dead zones inside a building, officers on scene must be prepared to identify and utilize other modes of communicating—especially in large complex incidents with multiple agencies operating in multiple locations. Some common practices in law enforcement for such circumstances is to assign “runners,” who will relay information to key actors within an incident response.
18. Law enforcement agencies must maintain and upgrade all equipment, including radios, when vulnerabilities are presented. In Uvalde, police radios should perform not just in the wide-open spaces that are prevalent throughout the county, but also in high density environments, such as school buildings. Furthermore, agencies should establish and train on radio operability contingency plans, such as point-to-point communication, which does not require repeaters or internal transmitters. Chapter 3. Leadership, Incident Command, and Coordination.
19. Agencies should develop and annually review policy that directs officers to make entry and engage the subject as quickly as possible during an active attacker incident.
20. Agencies should provide training to direct officers to make entry and engage the subject as quickly as possible during an active attacker incident.
21. Agencies should train supervisors and implement accountability measures to direct officers to make entry and engage the subject as quickly as possible during an active attacker incident.
22. The [first law enforcers on scene] should engage the subject regardless of whether they have additional officers on site.
23. Any intelligence should be shared immediately with all law enforcement present via police radio or any means possible.
24. Agency leaders must immediately determine incident status and the appropriate command structure for the event. Leadership must continually assess and adjust as the threat and incident evolve.
25. Leadership should ensure responders are appropriately provided with a situation status and decisions that affect their responsibilities and actions.
26. As soon as leadership is aware of an emotionally involved responder, they should make every attempt to extricate that officer from the hot zone once sufficient personnel are present. Based on the involvement, that officer can be directed to the command post for sharing of any information relevant to the response and incident.
27. As soon as possible and practical, the lead agency should establish a unified command that includes a representative from each primary first responder agency to facilitate communication, situational awareness, operational coordination, and allocation and delivery of resources.
28. As part of their pre-incident planning and preparation, regional agency leaders should determine a process for identifying a lead agency in a multi-jurisdiction response. 
29. A staging area manager should be designated to identify an appropriate area and direct additional personnel there for assignment of duties.
30. Agencies should examine their policies and procedures to ensure they address self-deployment guidance and protocols, to include uniform, equipment, and resources. 
31. Officers should follow agency policies and procedures that address self-deployment.
32. The establishment of an ICP [incident command post] for all agency leaders to report to so that brief and decisive action can be directed out toward the front-line officers is critical to resolving inaction and poor/no decision-making.
33. Agencies should be prepared to provide critical services or supplement these services by establishing interagency agreements and plans for mutual aid.
34. Agencies should engage with the EOC [emergency operations center] for assistance in implementing operational stability and a continuity of operations plan.
35. The ICP should provide timely direction, control, and coordination to the agency leadership, other agencies, and other critical stakeholders before, during, and after an event or upon notification of a credible threat. The ICP must also serve as an intelligence collection and dissemination hub.
36. Agency leadership should provide uninterrupted communication within the internal organization of the agency (or agencies if there is a unified command structure), externally to other agencies, and to all identified stakeholders. 
37. The ICP should establish and enact time-phased implementation procedures to activate various components of the plan to provide sufficient operational capabilities relative to the event or threat.
38. Agencies should ensure that persons in positions of authority have the requisite training and qualifications to carry out the responsibilities and duties of the title, including those serving in an acting capacity.
39. Agencies should train, plan, and prepare for mass violence incidents, including the need for incident command structure. 
40. Leaders should be trained and prepared to transition an incident or response to another leader within or outside of their agency when needed. 
41. Agencies should create and train on a policy, and set an expectation that leaders will act in a manner consistent with that policy during critical incidents. 
42. An [memorandum of understanding] MOU/memorandum of agreement (MOA) needs to be developed among agencies within a county or region that provides clarity on who is in command, taking into consideration an agency’s training, experience, equipment, and capacity to take the lead during a multiagency response to a critical incident. 
43. Agencies should train and practice together the areas covered in the MOU/MOA. The drills should include all first responders, elected officials, and critical infrastructure stakeholders. 
44. Law enforcement policy and training should be informed by research on leadership and decision-making theories, behaviors, functions, and practices.
45. Agencies should use the Incident Command System (ICS) for more than large-scale tactical events. They should incorporate as many of the ICS principles as possible in response to varying levels of emergencies or planned events, so ICS becomes a regular component of the agency’s culture.
46. Agencies should fully adopt NIMS throughout the region, even if not mandated as a FEMA Preparedness Grant recipient.
47. Agencies should consider using the NQS to improve response, command, and coordination. 
48. Agencies should ensure training and retraining of all staff regarding NIMS and the importance of standardized ICS implementation. 
49. Agencies should conduct drills, exercises, and tabletops on NIMS and include all first responders, elected officials, and other critical infrastructure stakeholders. 
50. Law enforcement agencies should develop and train personnel in tactical emergency medicine and provide the appropriate equipment, as well as collaborate with local EMS to provide this capability. 
51. First responder agencies should train and equip personnel using a rescue task force model. 
52. Agencies should work with emergency medical responders to develop a response, triage, and transport plan for mass casualty events. The protocols should be agreed upon, and member agencies should enter a formalized MOU. 
53. Agencies at the regional level should conduct executive-level, multiagency tabletop exercises through their EOC that include elected and appointed officials as well as department heads from other government agencies, relevant nongovernmental agencies, and hospitals and other responder agencies. This will not only prepare personnel, but also help define roles and responsibilities, identify available resources, and establish an agreed-upon unified command system. 
54. Agencies should consider adopting the recommendations from the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) publication Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents.
55. An incident safety officer should be designated as quickly as possible during incident response and should pay special attention to the access or egress of emergency vehicles.
56. Agencies should have a formal agreement or understanding on investigative command after a multiagency response.
57. Agencies should carefully assess the location of any command post during and after a critical incident to ensure it is suitable for the operations of a command post. Some considerations include accessibility, size and capacity, availability of resources, and safety and security.
58. Law enforcement agencies investigating any crime scene—especially complex, multiagency responses—should ensure a log is kept not only at the crime scene, but at the command post as well. The log ensures accurate record keeping and accountability for actions taken by the investigative team. Access to the command post should be limited to those with a need to be there. 
59. Leaders must respect the integrity of the crime scene and only access it with a declared and documented legitimate purpose. Crime scenes need to be held without contamination until completed. The crime scene team should be permitted to do their methodical work without continuous interruptions by VIPs who want to enter the crime scene but have no probative need to do so.
60. Investigative teams should ensure that inner and outer perimeters are established at all crime scenes. There was an outer security presence at the campus gate, but there was not a secured entrance to the building of the crime scene.
61. Investigative teams must properly assess weather conditions and the timing of investigative activities—particularly evidence collection—that must be conducted outside in the elements.
62. Law enforcement agencies investigating such incidents in which the form and functionality of physical evidence, such as doors, would benefit from testing should refrain from removing such items until they have been tested and such testing is formally documented via video recording and a written report.
63. Agencies in regional proximity to each other should conduct multiagency tabletop exercises (TTX) for complex investigations that may necessitate mutual aid and support from each other. Doing so will build greater interagency coordination in activities like evidence collection as well as understanding of jurisdictional boundaries, capabilities, processes, and expectations among partner agencies. The TTX should include local, state, and federal agencies, as appropriate, and be designed to exploit weaknesses, uncover strengths, and develop solutions.
64. Crime scene teams need to plan for logistical support, especially when traveling long distances to mass shootings. Identifying a dedicated coordinator for such efforts can help in the planning and ensure personnel arriving from out of town are able to find lodging nearby, including nontraditional options as needed, such as a private housing.
65. Organizational subunits should conduct after action reviews, particularly in the wake of critical incidents that provide a real-world test to their training, policies, and procedures. 
66. Crime scene investigators responding to incidents of mass violence should be prepared with a predesignated system to collect and align personal belongings to victims. 
67. Agencies should adopt parallel investigations policy for criminal and administrative investigations, including for major incidents, while taking diligent steps to ensure that information derived from compelled administrative interviews are completely walled off from any criminal investigation into the officer’s or agent’s actions. 
68. Agencies that engage in after action/critical incident reviews should adequately resource the effort to ensure high-quality and timely reports of lessons learned and areas for organizational improvement. 
69. Agencies’ personnel conducting interviews of individuals involved in a critical incident should be trained in trauma-informed interview techniques. 
70. Agencies should maintain a duty to collect officer statements for their own administrative records and investigations even as an external agency is conducting an investigation into the same matter. 
71. Memoranda of understanding on sharing investigative data should be established among partner agencies. 
72. Agencies should ensure they have procedures in place to identify and utilize forensic child witness interviewers, whether in-house or through mutual aid agreements.
73. When conducting investigations, law enforcement agencies should account for the racial, ethnic, gender, and cultural diversity of witnesses when making investigative assignments, including interviews.
74. Due to the possible occurrence of mass shootings regardless of jurisdiction size, all law enforcement agencies and local governments should plan for such critical incidents from a public messaging and crisis communication perspective. This requires relationship building, planning, training, and preparing before a large-scale incident.
75. Organizations must be prepared to swiftly develop proactive messages in an organized fashion to keep community members informed and establish a source of strength and leadership that can unite a community and assist with the healing process.
76. As quickly as possible, an agency should inform the public regarding the nature of the critical incident and how it will release information regarding it. 
77. An agency should create a new social media post or message each time it has new information to release. This will help reach a larger audience instead of updating the initial post. 
78. The first or second post from an agency should establish the agency as the official source of information, which reduces confusion about how information will be released.
79. Agencies should instruct the public that other modes of incoming communication, with the exception of emergency calls, will be shut down to allow staff to focus on the accuracy and timeliness of information via the official platform. 
80. Messaging to the public should include identification of the lead agency or a transition to another agency as the lead. This level of transparency ensures accountability to the public when people are seeking reassurance, order, and answers.
81. Information should be confirmed by two sources if at all possible before it is shared publicly. If false information is shared, it must be corrected as soon as possible on social media, and if the content is highly newsworthy, it should be addressed in the next news conference as well. The agency should explain how the false information ended up being released. Delays will erode public trust in the organization. 
82. Agencies should monitor social media and media coverage to understand the totality of the circumstances, which includes community sentiment. This may guide the incident commander to share information that initially was being withheld in order to refute a false narrative. The role of monitoring social media and media coverage should be assigned to a specific individual as stipulated by the communication plan and can even involve a neighboring agency. 
83. To establish leadership and a sense of order, the lead agency must be swift, proactive, accurate, and transparent in its messaging. Relevant information that is not law enforcement-sensitive should typically be released as soon as it is confirmed. However, speed must be balanced with the need for accuracy. It is critical that information is verified before it is released even when there is tremendous pressure to release information quickly. 
84. As part of a community-wide comprehensive emergency response protocol, school districts should have a safety plan for each school which includes a reunification and communication section on how they will direct parents/family members when a crisis occurs. Selected district personnel should be designated in advance to assist emergency personnel as family members rush to the school or reunification location. 
85. School district leadership needs to develop a system for documenting which children are present and which parent or guardian has retrieved them using a sign in/out, checkoff, and/or smartphone picture system to document for safety, notification, and reunification purposes. 
86. Information about locations for notification, family assistance, and property return should be as specific as possible, including the location address. These posts should be prepared in advance when possible and pre-tested during exercises testing the crisis communications plan.
87. As soon as any type of mass casualty or active assailant incident occurs, law enforcement should serve as the lead on public safety messaging and updates on status of the incident and the criminal investigation. Once the situation has been rendered safe, the affected entity should take the lead with providing information to the public about operations and issues affecting the facility. Each agency (e.g., school district and law enforcement agency) should share or link to the others’ content on social media. This will help them avoid contradicting each other.
88. When a community suffers a traumatic incident, a law enforcement leader should work to establish a feeling of safety in the community with a news briefing as soon as possible. The news briefing should announce the status of the situation and when the situation is resolved, and include details of how that was accomplished. If an incident is not quickly resolved, the leader should hold regular news briefings to keep the community informed. The leader should strive to show strength balanced with compassion and care for those suffering tragic injuries and losses.
89. When reunification is complete and the victims’ families have been notified, the lead agency should release that information to the community. This is a crucial step in unifying the community to start the healing process. 
90. The lead agency should institute incident command and establish a JIC [Joint Information Center] for coordinating the release of all public information, including victim information from all medical facilities that can be incorporated into coordinated news briefings.
91. Once the agency leading the JIC learns that patients are being transported to hospitals outside the region, a PIO [public information officer] should be assigned to call the hospitals to coordinate the release of information. This duty can be filled by an outside PIO who has arrived to assist, which should be outlined in the crisis communication plan.
92. A news conference with a law enforcement executive from the lead agency, who was not intrinsically involved in the response and so would not risk jeopardizing a criminal case or consciously or unconsciously provide unreliable facts, should take place on scene as soon as the scene is rendered safe. If the incident is elongated, a briefing should take place while the event is still in progress and should be held nearby the scene to reassure the community.
93. An on-scene location for the press conference helps instill confidence that law enforcement is effectively handling the situation and that the people watching the news conference are safe. 
94. The law enforcement leader conducting news conferences should attempt to be responsive to all media questions. While it may not be possible to answer questions related to the ongoing investigation, it is possible to be responsive by explaining the process or announcing when more specific information may be released. 
95. An agency should release the number of deceased and injured victims as soon as the information is confirmed. There is no benefit to gain from a delay. 
96. Consistent leadership needs to unite the community through a projection of strength and empathy. This is also vital for the community’s healing process. 
97. The designated lead spokesperson and agency should establish a JIC and a media staging area in line of sight of the command post. 
98. A schedule of briefings should be created, and other agencies should be invited to send PIOs to work with the lead spokesperson to coordinate the release of information. If possible, joint news conferences of local, state, and federal agencies should take place at this location, based on that schedule. 
99. All media should be given the opportunity to receive the same information at the same time via news conferences or previously identified social media or other releases. This prevents inadvertent contradictory news stories that can be caused by using a different selection of words in each interview. It also avoids the appearance of an agency favoring a specific media outlet or outlets, which can cause other reporters to become more assertive. 
100. The lead agency should be working to release basic details in follow-up news conferences, such as an update on the number of victims and their conditions, information about the subject, the type of weapon(s) used, and the status of the investigation. Some activities take place at every crime scene and can be shared, such as meeting with victims’ family members, identifying witnesses, conducting interviews with witnesses and the involved officers, or processing the crime scene. Talking about these activities at the news conference does not compromise the investigation, and it shows the community that law enforcement is making progress. 
101. An agency should disable scheduled posts during a critical incident as part of its crisis communication plan. 
102. When an organization recognizes that an error has occurred, it should admit the mistake and share what actions it is taking to rectify the problem and prevent it from happening again. Even when the mistake is egregious, an agency can maintain or seek to regain public trust by being open and holding itself accountable to the community. In these moments, a law enforcement agency can build community trust by holding itself to the highest possible standard. 
103. Agencies should use social media and the local media to reassure the community with clarity and confidence that any loss of life would be investigated quickly and appropriately. This accountability is necessary for any critical incident that significantly impacts a community. 
104. Agency spokespersons should be briefed by those most knowledgeable on the facts of the incident prior to public comments. 
105. Effective communication requires law enforcement agencies to listen to their communities’ concerns and be responsive to them. 
106. In a community with a large population with limited English proficiency, officials should post emergency information in English and in other predominant languages. This inclusive approach will help ensure that critical public safety messages reach a larger audience and will help boost trust.
107. In a community with a large population with limited English proficiency, officials should enlist the assistance of a local television, radio, or social media channel that caters to the non-English predominant culture and language of the community. 
108. An agency should be as direct as possible when it is revealing law enforcement mistakes in responses and actions. An indirect approach can undermine faith and trust in law enforcement. 
109. Formal and informal leaders and other community members can help responders to better understand the community’s cultural beliefs around health, mental health, and help-seeking. Demographic information should be integrated into tailoring services to make them less stigmatized and more acceptable to those in need. Services should be culturally appropriate for the community they serve. 
110. Agencies should incorporate culturally sensitive communications into early communications during a crisis. 
111. All persons involved in delivering information during and after a mass violence incident should be trained in best practices that are victim-centered, trauma-informed, and culturally appropriate. Typically, a trained PIO or designated representative should be the person speaking to the press and family members or advising the designated representative as to the best-practices approach. 
112. Law enforcement and other government officials within the affected community should develop a comprehensive plan for media engagement to centralize information sharing, maintain consistency in messaging, and build trust within the community as a legitimate source of information.
113. Images and reports of the details of violent crimes, especially those involving the injury and death of children, are traumatic to anyone exposed to them. Those who conduct investigations, legal representatives, and government officials, as well as family members who request such details, should be prepared and supported before and after such exposure.
114. Any details shared publicly by government officials should have a purpose and not be gratuitous. 
115. Local leaders and law enforcement representatives providing information to victims and family members need to be trained or, at a minimum, knowledgeable about how and when it is appropriate to hold a family and victim forum, the purpose of such an informational forum, and how to conduct it in a victim-centered, trauma-sensitive manner. Giving voice to victims and family members (active and deep listening), allowing them the time they need to express themselves, validating their concerns, identifying actions that can be taken, providing resources, and ensuring follow up to outstanding questions are all best practices that should be followed by anyone engaging with victims and family members. 
116. Intentional transparency is needed for the victims, survivors, and loved ones who are seeking answers about what happened; however, authorities need to provide information in a trauma-informed, victim-centered, and culturally sensitive manner. 
117. Law enforcement, local leaders, and other responders can support the recovery of victims and families by giving them opportunities to be fully heard, have their concerns validated, and receive information through a transparent lens. 
118. The responsibility of responders is to rely on training and preparation to remain calm when interacting with children so as not to increase the children’s fear or lessen their sense of safety. 
119. Evacuation planning should involve designating dynamic evacuation routes and safe spaces where the evacuees will be guided for safety, medical triage, and emotional support. 
120. Evacuees should be provided clear instructions and directions on where to proceed. Where resources are available, a corridor of law enforcement personnel should be set up to ensure the evacuees are unimpeded and directed in a safe manner. 
121. Evacuees should be triaged and medically assessed once evacuated and prior to reunification with next of kin to ensure that all injuries are immediately identified and that victims receive necessary care. 
122. As part of evacuation planning, school officials should develop an identification system for tracking students who leave with their parents or guardians, to include on site where possible. 
123. Officials should ensure all victims of a mass violence incident are screened medically and assessed for mental health concerns soon after evacuation and no later than 24-48 hours post-incident. 
124. In the weeks and months following an incident, victims and family members should receive follow-up or continued monitoring to ensure they are receiving the necessary mental health care and other services. 
125. School officials should create a process that allows reunification outside of the Notification/Reception Center, whenever necessary and collect victims’ names, photos of their guardians, and location of reunification. 
126. As part of establishing a command post, law enforcement and other officials should secure the entire facility around the post and, if possible, evacuate civilians. In all cases, family members, community members, media, and other onlookers need to be kept out of the hot zone for their safety. 
127. The incident commander should assign a communications officer or liaison officer to provide timely and accurate information on the status of the response to family members and the community, help provide a sense of calm and trust, and maintain order. 
128. Agencies should incorporate de-escalation tactics and trauma-informed, victim-centered, culturally sensitive approaches into their training on crowd control, emergency management, mass casualty response, and emergency/crisis communications. 
129. Law enforcement and other responder agencies have a responsibility to limit exposure to traumatic crime scenes—including deceased victims’ bodies—to those with a formal role. Leaders should consider using tents or vehicles to shield the crime scene from view, or widening the perimeter to keep it out of sight. 
130. Responding agencies should also limit the exposure of community members, school staff, and their own agency staff to traumatic materials. 
131. As part of disaster preparedness, communities should plan to establish a Notification/Reception Center. Planning should include determining where the center will be, who will be in charge, what security measures it will have, how the reunification process will be conducted, what screening of victims and families will take place, and how public communications and media will be handled. Establishing and managing a Notification/Reception Center should also be part of the community’s critical incident drills. 
132. All evacuees and their next of kin should receive information about where to receive services and resources once they leave the Notification/Reception Center. Victim advocates should contact all identified victims for follow up at various points after the incident to ensure they are aware of services and engaging in help seeking. 
133. Pre-incident planning and preparation should include determining where to have families wait for their loved one during a mass violence incident. 
134. Pre-planning should include developing a plan that removes barriers for families and loved ones to enter the hospital, receive updates, and see their loved ones. 
135. Clear, accurate, and frequent communication needs to be provided to the families and loved ones at the Notification/Reception Center. 
136. Any information about the number of deaths or the process of identification should be communicated by a single trained and trusted leader who has verified the information and invites each family to a private space to discuss the situation involving their loved one. 
137. Law enforcement agencies should assign compassionate and trauma-trained personnel to collect identifying information and descriptions of victims, including clothing and photos. These individuals can also be a constant presence with the families, monitoring them for any medical or security needs, answering any questions, and ensuring they have necessities such as water, tissues, and medication. 
138. Victim advocates should be assigned to communicate with and assist families. Each family member of a deceased person and each injured victim should be assigned a victim advocate who works with that family/victim consistently throughout the treatment and recovery period, having frequent communications to ensure the family/victim is aware of and able to access needed services and supports. 
139. Officers or other representatives tasked with death notification should be trained in accordance with agency policies and procedures. This is a highly sensitive function that should not be performed by those who have not received specialized training in how to conduct victim-centered, trauma-informed, and culturally appropriate death notifications. 
140. Local officials engaging in trauma and death notifications should consult national resources and ensure best practices are followed when providing these notifications. Preparedness and planning can help a locality identify areas where they have fewer trained or experienced staff, thus the areas where they need mutual aid supports. 
141. A trauma notification team should comprise two people: one law enforcement officer and one victim advocate or behavioral health provider. 
142. The number of trauma notifications that an individual makes should be closely monitored, and trauma services should be made available to those providing notifications. 
143. The post-incident command post should assign a central coordinating entity to track law enforcement and responder agencies at the incident and others who may have been involved (e.g., dispatchers, technicians, and other support services personnel). This tracking should continue after the incident to ensure that appropriate trauma-related services are offered in a coordinated effort with appropriate follow-ups. 
144. A comprehensive approach to psychological support services for responder personnel during an MCI [mass casualty incident] should include immediate and ongoing interventions, education, and training to promote mental health and wellness. 
145. Support services for responder personnel should be provided on site for the duration of the incident, including while law enforcement and other personnel are on site processing the scene, collecting evidence, and conducting their investigation. 
146. Responder agencies should have a system for monitoring personnel stress during and in the months after an MCI. This can include regular check-ins with personnel and using assessment tools to identify individuals who may be struggling. 
147. Responder agencies should develop a comprehensive and integrated trauma support plan that includes outreach, follow-up, and ongoing support for responders. 
148. Leaders from responder agencies need to provide services to all personnel involved in an MCI, which for some agencies means everyone on their staff. These services should include resources on post-disaster behavioral health and secondary traumatic stress, referrals to health care providers, and peer support. 
149. Responder agencies should consider memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with regional agencies for trauma support services if none exist in the local area.
150. Multiagency cooperation, collaboration, and communication are necessary to help identify all those impacted by an incident and ensure outreach and follow on to all victims. MOUs/MOAs between agencies, as part of a comprehensive incident response plan, should be considered. 
151. Preparation for an MCI should include a plan for multiagency deployment when an incident impacts a large segment of the community. The plan should include a written agreement (e.g., MOUs, mutual aid agreements, interagency agreements, jurisdictional agreements) that can be operationalized at the time of an event and allow for rapid identification and deployment of responders. If possible, leaders should shift resources to avoid those who will not have the risk of a shared trauma experience. 
152. A multiagency response can also assist in the transfer of services to other victim advocates when personal relationships impede generally accepted practices and when the scope of the trauma overwhelms the local community responders. 
153. As part of disaster preparedness planning, communities—including law enforcement—need to plan for the aftermath of a critical incident. This planning should include generally accepted practice processes, education and training, support, and resources. A trauma-informed, culturally sensitive approach should be applied to the victims, survivors, and impacted community members, as well as responders and their families. 
154. Following an MCI, local and government officials should conduct a needs assessment within a specific time frame and in collaboration with the county or state health services authority to capture the needs of the community. In Uvalde, the Texas Office for Victims of Crime or another entity should complete a new, comprehensive mental health needs assessment that addresses the families, victims, responders, and community members of the impacted Uvalde community specifically. The agency performing this needs assessment should conduct extensive outreach efforts to find and attend to the victims and families in Uvalde who require guidance, referrals, and concrete assistance with obtaining funds, medical care, and behavioral health services. 
155. The needs assessment should inform an outreach plan to identify impacted persons who may have been left out of the original assessment. 
156. Post-incident care should ensure that all people in the spheres of influence receive outreach, support, and services either directly or through broad public communications outreach. 
157. A lead community agency should be designated to take on this important activity and coordinate services with other response organizations in Uvalde and across Texas. 
158. An FAC [Family Assistance Center] should be established within 24 hours of an incident with a security plan that includes external law enforcement presence and a process for internal vetting of providers and those seeking services. 
159. The FAC should be staffed with a robust number and type of organizations that meet the needs of the community. 
160. Victims, families, and community members should be met at the FAC by a professional and be aided throughout the process by a victim navigator or victim service personnel. 
161. An MOU or MOA should be signed between key organizations (such as state law enforcement organizations and the FBI) to allow for the sharing of vital victim information, ensuring that outreach is made to all victims, families, and those affected. 
162. The location for an FAC/FRC [Family Resiliency Center] needs to be decided based on space, convenience, public transportation accessibility, and privacy, if possible. 
163. As part of the pre-planning for an MCI, FAC leadership officials need to consider housing implications. It may be useful to model housing needs based on Uvalde or use local partnerships to reserve room blocks with the goal of having space for families, service providers, and law enforcement coming into the area. 
164. Unaffiliated, unknown, and spontaneous volunteers need to be managed by an agency with experience in identifying needs in the community, managing volunteers, and verifying the credentials or experience of those who come to help but are not affiliated with any known response agency. There is training available to learn how to address this phenomenon. 
165. Therapy dogs or crisis response dogs that have completed their certification and handler training may be of help in mass violence events, especially when victims include children. Organizations can deploy certified, trained teams of dogs and handlers to support victims. 
166. When establishing eligibility for support programs, the “spheres of influence” or other similar models should be factors for eligibility. Eligibility criteria for state compensation programs should be in line with those established by state law and federal rules. 
167. A single form should be used to capture basic contact information, as well as information needed about the victim and the incident. This form should be usable for all applications for financial and other support services, to avoid adding to the burden of the victims and families. 
168. Law enforcement agencies need to be prepared for scammers to establish fraudulent accounts and other criminals to use a tragedy for their personal gain. The FAC should have law enforcement representation to assist families with navigating these situations. 
169. The FAC/FRC, including victim service providers, law enforcement, and other authorities, should proactively work with the families of victims and survivors to set up alerts, freeze credit reports, and quickly identify other criminal and fraudulent activity. 
170. In preparing for long-term needs, the FRC should provide financial literacy and security education and awareness to victims and family members. 
171. Law enforcement agencies should develop a trauma-informed, victim-centered process for returning personal effects. 
172. Responder agencies should use a modified version of CISD, such as SFA, as part of their trauma and support services following an incident. 
173. Agencies should include peer support services and resources in their comprehensive support services plan, which may include regional or statewide networks. 
174. Agency leadership needs to support the supporters and ensure that adequate trauma leave is provided to help deployed personnel decompress and return from a traumatic event. 
175. Responder agencies should provide in-depth trauma and counseling services to staff who provide victim services at an MCI.
176. Agency leadership should consider offering or expanding the window for trauma leave to ensure that a deployed member can take the necessary leave and will not be perceived as incapable of future deployments simply because they utilized available resources. 
177. Agency leaders should ensure there is coverage for the normal duties of deployed personnel so that the deployed individuals can focus on their deployment and take the necessary leave. 
178. Dispatchers should be recognized as first responders to a critical incident and screened for services. They should be included in efforts to provide mental health screenings and care as well as peer and other supports post-incident. All agencies should have policies and resources for the well-being of their personnel and families. 
179. The definition of responders should be expanded, consistent with generally accepted practices, to include disciplines other than law enforcement, fire, and rescue staff, such as dispatchers, EMTs, health care providers, ambulance drivers, behavioral health providers, and faith-based leaders. This should be reflected in all support services provided by resiliency centers, nongovernmental and governmental entities, and other support service providers. 
180. When developing or reviewing trauma support and counseling services, agencies should include spouses, partners, and family members of responders. 
181. Responder agencies should organize and implement a formalized plan that outlines the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder for the effective management of emotional and trauma support. 
182. Responder agencies should provide initial support services within hours of a critical incident and within 24 hours should provide access to services such as PFA/SFA, crisis counseling, debriefing, and peer support. 
183. Responder leaders can reduce the stigma associated with seeking help for emotional and psychological distress and can promote the importance of self-care through training, education, and effective messaging and modeling. 
184. After a critical incident, responder agencies should evaluate the effectiveness of their emotional and trauma support services. This can be achieved through gathering feedback from responders and their family members and using this information to improve future services and support.
185. A transition plan and a warm, organized handoff should occur whenever law enforcement victim services personnel, or other victim navigators, transition away from the FAC/FRC. 
186. A checklist should be used by the FAC/FRC to ensure that all transitions are conducted in a deliberate and compassionate manner. 
187. Agencies should consider MOUs/MOAs with neighboring or state agencies for assistance providing victim services. 
188. Research on trauma-informed care teaches that some victims will have memory deficits and other cognitive impacts as a result of the brain’s response to the trauma. This means that advocates and other support staff need to provide continuous support, follow on, and monitoring to ensure that applications for services and referrals are completed. 
189. The UTRC should offer more community-based activities with opportunities for victims, family members, and the community to come together, receive services, and share space to help them on their recovery path. 
190. The UTRC should engage with the OVC-funded National Mass Violence Victimization Resource Center Resiliency Center Director Forum network. Connecting with other FRCs can help the UTRC ensure it is meeting the Uvalde community’s needs in a trauma-informed, victim-centered approach and appropriate cultural adaptations.
191. The UTRC must develop a plan to ensure all victims, family members, and responders receive outreach and education on its services, crime victim compensation, and resources. 
192. The UTRC should plan to sustain this space and its offerings, especially since support services need to be made available for an extended period of time in this community.
193. Behavioral health services offered in various modalities, such as individual, group, and family therapies, may help people feel more comfortable, as they will be able to choose which modality they prefer. 
194. Evidence-based mental health care is necessary so that victims and family members do not become discouraged by continuing symptoms and a lack of effective treatment. 
195. Training on evidence-based behavioral health supports—including resilience-building activities, cognitive behavioral therapy for disaster distress, peer support for victims of mass violence, writing for recovery, and other supports—should begin as soon as possible so that providers in the community have the knowledge and skills to provide effective mental health treatment. 
196. Efforts to attract professionals who are interested and able to live and work in the Uvalde community also need to begin as soon as possible. 
197. Advocating for the broader use of teletherapy could increase access to competent providers who could serve this highly impacted population. 
198. Victim advocates and grief specialists can support victims’ families through the funeral arrangement process and help the community determine where to hold activities like candlelight vigils. 
199. Law enforcement and other governmental officials need to create a security plan to protect the safety, security, and privacy of those mourning their loved ones during funerals for an MCI. 
200. As part of the planning for a disaster, authorities should assign a public information officer or communications representative who will work with the media in advance of funerals. This role should include setting up a media staging area as well as consulting with families to determine if relatives or friends would like to speak on their behalf. 
201. Victims and family members need to be involved in the movement of any informal memorials prior to action being taken. 
202. The planning for a permanent memorial should include a broad community coalition of advisers, including survivors, family members of victims, school personnel, victim service providers, and other relevant stakeholders. 
203. The memorial should honor those lost, those injured, and all those directly impacted by the incident. 
204. The Uvalde community could benefit from long-term support from grief and loss specialists who can help guide the community in rituals, memorial planning, spiritual activities, and social supports as they move through the next few years. 
205. Community organizers, disaster behavioral health specialists, victim support staff, and those skilled in helping communities repair societal damage and build resilience may be able to help Uvalde get onto a recovery path. This will require strong, compassionate, collaborative, and honest efforts by community leadership.
206. School district police departments should enter into MOUs that establish mutually agreed upon clear jurisdictional responsibilities with other neighboring agencies that are likely to respond to a critical incident on school property. The MOUs should account for not only routine criminal activity, but also critical incidents. The MOU should address the issue of unified command, in addition to incident command, and account for the capacity and capabilities of the respective agencies.
207. Law enforcement, first responders, emergency management, and other municipal government agencies should coordinate with school districts to conduct multiagency preparedness exercises on at least an annual basis. Exercises should operate in accordance with the state and local regulations regarding active threat exercises. The exercises should be incorporated into the EOPs and Campus Safety Plans.
208. All law enforcement agencies within school districts should participate in safety and security planning. Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction should assign leaders from within their agencies (either the sheriff or chief deputy sheriff) to participate on the committee. That individual can serve as a liaison between the school district and the sheriffs’ offices and help both entities maintain awareness of safety and security concerns that may intersect the two. 
209. Communities should adopt a multidisciplinary approach to school safety that includes school police, law enforcement, school officials, mental health professionals, and other community stakeholders. It is especially important that all voices in the school community be heard, including faculty, staff, administrators, counselors, nurses, resource officers, parents, and students. Every stakeholder must feel empowered to play a role in reducing fear and raising the level of safety in and around schools. Each campus should establish and train school safety committees that will meet at least monthly for this purpose. 
210. School district campus safety teams must be intentional and deliberative in the development of their campus-specific plans and ensure they are reviewed and updated regularly. UCISD should work with campus administrators across the district to institutionalize a set of expectations for these plans that reflects the specific physical and social environments and safety and security needs of each campus. 
211. School district threat assessment teams must establish a systematic procedure for identifying, assessing, and managing threat assessments under their review. 
212. Threat assessment teams must develop an operations manual that governs and documents their activities, outputs, roles and responsibilities, and coordination across the school district. At minimum, the manual should adhere to standards set forth by oversight bodies. In the case of UCISD, this would be the Texas School Safety Center, as required in the Texas Education Code.
213. All school district staff and school district police personnel should receive training on the district’s threat assessment processes, including the role of all staff in appropriately identifying and reporting concerning behavior. The training should be interactive and include scenarios and discussion to help trainees practice applying the course content. 
214. School districts should implement a system of door audits that are conducted routinely and systematically, and they should be documented. At UCISD, this responsibility can be assigned to the new safety monitor positions it has recently created. Door audits should be incorporated into school district campus safety plans. All school district staff and school district police personnel should have a shared responsibility to ensure doors are locked, as per policy. 
215. School districts should invest in upgrading or replacing all doors (or locks) throughout its campuses to remedy this issue, so that doors can be locked from the inside. 
216. School districts should implement universal access boxes. A universal access box refers to a locked box that contains master keys, located near the entry points of school buildings, that can be accessed by authorized emergency first responders and school district staff. 
217. School districts should ensure that emergency alert systems are well-understood by all staff. In the case of UCISD [Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District], district leadership should issue a district-wide clarification on the use of PA systems in conjunction with Raptor emergency alerts. 
218. School districts should offer both standard training and refresher training, as needed, on the use of their emergency alert system, available to all district employees. 
219. School districts should implement a policy that requires the type of emergency event to be formally documented in their emergency alert system, so that school administrators can better identify and report trends and the most frequent causes of lockdowns and other emergency response protocols. 
220. School districts must ensure that all campus buildings where there is student activity are retrofitted for Wi-Fi communication to ensure that emergency alerts are received in a timely manner. 
221. Active threat training for students and staff should be expanded to include all areas of the school campus. UCISD should ensure that drills take place in the many settings that teachers and students find themselves in throughout the school year, not just inside the classroom. While the classroom is the most likely location of students in a real-life emergency, they should be prepared to engage in standard response protocols from other locations on campus. 
222. UCISD should invite other law enforcement agencies to attend, observe, and participate in drills. 
223. Drills should be conducted in accordance with the Texas Education Code 37.114, and proper documentation should be submitted to appropriate UCISD leadership for record-keeping. 
224. UCISD must reconsider the preeminence of the lockdown procedure in a dynamic, evolving situation, where the risk of remaining in place may outweigh the risk of finding a way to exit the area, which in the incident at Robb Elementary led to UCISD staff and students running into the building to lock down. Teachers, staff, and students must be provided with options for protecting themselves and helping to protect others. 
225. School districts should meticulously consider, plan, and execute if they decide to establish their own police department. Budgeting, hiring practices, training, development of standard operating procedures, and student/community engagement should all be built into the design and execution of a school district police department. 
226. The draft version of the UCISD PD policies, procedures, and operational plans should be evaluated to ensure alignment with the highest industry standards, starting with high-risk operations such as response to an active attack and other potential crises that threaten school climate and safety. Professional organizations, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Association of School Resource Officers, offer a range of model policies, toolkits, technical assistance, training, and other resources to inform the policy and operational planning evaluation process. 
227. UCISD PD should undergo an accreditation process that measures compliance against generally accepted standards and practices. Accreditation is a voluntary process administered by state police associations as well as national organizations like the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. Many standards require the development of written directives or activities that reflect the agency’s policies, procedures, and general orders. The accreditation process enables the review and revision of policies to ensure practices meet current professional criteria for excellence in service, strengthen agency operations, and increase public trust. 
228. A school police department has the responsibilities of both a law enforcement agency and a member of the school environment, necessitating a heavy burden on the agency and officers to serve in these dual roles. The reconstituted UCISD PD must make intentional efforts to routinely engage with UCISD staff and students at all campuses. Regular engagement can help contribute to a safer learning environment by promoting safety, fostering positive relationships, discouraging misconduct, and improving the perception of law enforcement throughout the school district. The UCISD PD chief and all officers should be evaluated on these efforts. 
229. Every agency must have a clear and concise policy on responding to active attacker situations.
230. Agencies should regularly review AARs with other regional agencies to plan as a region for a coordinated and collaborative response to possible similar events.
231. Agencies should consider obtaining state- or national-level accreditation to adopt and maintain standardized policies and procedures. This process also ensures accountability and transparency that can enhance confidence and trust in law enforcement among the communities they serve. 
232. Appointing authorities and senior officials of local government should develop a resilient emergency management system in which the emergency response plans of their respective units of government and operating departments, e.g., fire, police, sheriff, EMS, public health, public works, school system, planning, and social services, are understood and shared. 
233. Appointing authorities should direct the professional emergency manager at the highest level of local government to coordinate this system that would also include private sector stakeholders representing public utilities, healthcare providers and leaders responsible for critical infrastructure. 
234. Government leaders should consider adopting a resolution that demonstrates their commitment to NIMS. 
235. Senior officials should guide all government, business, and organization leaders (including faith-based and secular nonprofit groups) to coordinate and collaborate with the emergency manager so they can act decisively before, during, and after disasters. 
236. Senior officials should personally participate in and provide direction for conducting exercises and evaluation programs that enhance familiarity and coordination among the whole community. 
237. Local governments should conduct outreach to state emergency management agencies and federal entities such as the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program and the NEP for assistance with exercise resources and training. 
238. The Office of Emergency Management should identify volunteer groups and local businesses who will consistently play a role in emergency planning and preparedness before, during, and after disasters. Business and industry partners should work through voluntary organizations to support local government in planning, preparing, and providing resources when responding to emergency situations. 
239. Senior officials should develop a pre-disaster recovery plan that enables them to anticipate what will be needed to restore the community as quickly as possible after an emergency. FEMA offers the Community Recovery Management Toolkit, which provides a three-step process of organizing, planning, and managing recovery. 
240. Regional public safety partners should plan, train, and exercise unified command for complex incidents. This includes federal, state, and local law enforcement, fire, EMS, and emergency management as well as other governmental and non-governmental agencies that would respond to a critical incident. 
241. Agencies should hold regular regional interdepartmental interoperability communication drills. 
242. Elected officials should establish a Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group to provide policy guidance to incident personnel and support resource prioritization and allocation. Typically, these groups are made up of government agency or private sector executives and administrators whose organizations are either impacted by, or provide resources to, an incident. MAC Groups enable decision-making among senior officials and executives, and delegate command authority to the incident commander to cooperatively define the response and recovery mission and strategic direction. Additionally, MAC Groups identify operational priorities and communicate those objectives to the Emergency Operations Center and the pertinent functions of the Incident command system and the joint information center. 
243. Elected and senior officials should receive training made available through the FEMA Emergency Management Institute (EMI) that provides a menu of courses designed specifically for senior officials. In addition to independent online study courses in the NIMS, ICS, Unified Command, and other basic emergency management training, EMI offers specialized inperson training for senior officials. The portfolio of courses includes Emergency Management for Senior Officials, NIMS Overview for Senior Officials, and Recovery from Disaster: Local Community Roles. Senior officials should work with their professional emergency manager for specific course recommendations. States may also have specific training programs and offerings. 
244. Senior officials should establish mutual aid agreements that set forth terms and conditions under which the parties will agree to provide resources, personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies to support responses to critical incidents that create an extreme risk to public safety. 
245. State POSTs and other training entities should work with state legislatures and law enforcement leaders within their state to conduct coordinated routine reviews of mandatory training programs for peace officers within their state to determine what is the appropriate balance of training topics and courses. Mandatory training time/requirements should include training options focused on unique, complex tactical events, such as an active attacker. 
246. Whenever possible, multiagency training should be offered to lessen the load of any one law enforcement agency. Multiagency training allows for cost- and resource-sharing and, more importantly, allows peace officers to train with other agencies that are typically going to respond jointly to a major incident. Building relationships through training and in advance of a major incident are critical in the successful response to, management of, and resolution of a major incident when one happens. 
247. All law enforcement should be required to take awareness-level NIMS courses, such as ICS-100 and IS-700. 
248. All ranked individuals should be required to take courses and refresher training on ICS/NIMS. These skills should be exercised through an annual multijurisdictional, multidisciplinary tabletop. 
249. Law enforcement agencies should provide a total of 8 hours of scenario-based, stress-induced active shooter training annually for officers at all levels of ranks in the training. 
250. Law enforcement agencies should work closely with schools and other vulnerable places to understand how occupants are taught to respond to an active attacker threat (e.g., kids were taught to be quiet in a dark room, while some officers reported they were listening for voices and believed the dark classrooms meant they were unoccupied). 
251. Research should be conducted to determine if the response to an active attacker threat should include changing the “normal environment” (e.g., lights off). 
252. TCOLE should consider revising the SBLE training guidebook based on the recommendations in the CIR. 
253. Agencies must include in pre-incident planning timely access to building diagrams and universal building/room access, particularly critical infrastructure, schools, and buildings where large numbers of persons gather on a regular basis.
254. Interagency training, drills, and exercises help to build relationships at the front-line officer level and, if attended by law enforcement supervisors, can further strengthen relationships and the efficacy of a multiagency response to a mass casualty incident. Though policies may differ slightly among agencies, overarching commonalities are the same in an active attacker incident. 
255. Agencies should provide preparedness education and training on trauma and stress management to all personnel, including coping strategies for managing stress and trauma during and after a mass casualty incident. 
256. Agencies should develop and maintain a comprehensive crisis response plan to address the mental health needs of their personnel during a mass casualty incident. 
257. Responder organizations should provide pre- and post-response behavioral health support to help mitigate and address the development of compassion fatigue, secondary traumatic stress, and vicarious trauma. This support can include education and training, policies and procedures, and services. 
258. The stigma of seeking mental health and trauma support in the law enforcement community needs to be counteracted by education, training, policies, protocols, and leadership, which create an environment that acknowledges and respects the mental wellness of law enforcement to the same extent as the physical aspects of policing. 
259. It is necessary to tailor the application of services for the diverse types of responders (fire/EMS, law enforcement, victim services, dispatchers, etc.) so that the language used and the examples of the types of symptoms they may experience are more applicable to their unique experiences and roles. 
260. Preparedness exercises should include regularly scheduled age-appropriate, trauma-informed drills; prescribed instructions/procedures; and clear communication. All stakeholders (school personnel, law enforcement, parents and guardians, students, and other relevant stakeholders) should be involved in the process and informed to help decrease anxiety and chaos. 
261. Preparedness planning should include considerations for language access for those with English as a second language. Materials, instructions, and communication should be provided in the languages prevalent in the community. 
262. Law enforcement, fire, and any other relevant stakeholder PIOs should obtain FEMA basic and advanced public information officer certifications as a baseline of training. 
263. The FEMA PIO courses should be only a first step in communications training. Agencies should research regional and national training opportunities for building upon the FEMA classes.
264. Law enforcement PIOs should network at the state and national level (e.g., attend national police conferences that have a PIO section) to learn common practices for managing the public messaging of major incidents and to network with peers in the field. 
265. Concepts learned in basic crisis communication classes must then be adopted into a crisis communication plan that is drilled and practiced with all involved personnel. 
266. Partnering agencies should review their crisis communication plans together to ensure they complement each other. It is critically important that the commitment to coordinating messaging is practiced with smaller events, so it is not a foreign concept when a largescale incident takes place. 
267. The social media policies of law enforcement agencies should clearly state how social media should be used to communicate with the community during critical incident situations. 
268. When an agency is hosting operational exercises, it should establish a JIC and engage all participating agencies to ensure coordinated public messaging is practiced and incorporated into planning for a large-scale incident. 
269. Each PIO should draft a crisis communication plan and practice it at least four times a year with smaller events. This will help identify problem areas and solutions and ensure everyone is familiar with the plan and knows their role instead of trying to figure that out during a crisis. 
270. The EOC should host regional PIO meetings every quarter. The meetings should include law enforcement, fire, city and county government, hospitals, public and private schools, universities, airports, military bases, universities, and other large organizations in the area. This creates an opportunity for relationship building, planning for joint operations and largescale incidents that cross jurisdictional lines, and devising plans to support each other during major events. 
271. After a comprehensive discussion, regional PIO meetings should be opened to the local media. This builds productive working relationships and allows the media and communication professionals to work out issues that arise. 
272. When incidents involve multiple agencies, it is critical for the lead organization sending out the public messaging to have previously established a process by planning with the other agencies. On the day of an incident, the lead organization should coordinate with the others to ensure the accurate messaging that the public expects and deserves. 
273. When a mass casualty incident occurs, the lead agency should organize news conferences through the JIC. All supporting agencies should have an opportunity to contribute information about the incident. This ensures a comprehensive release of consistent information.